Possibilities and Challenges in Rohingya Repatriation: Quest for A New Diplomatic Maneuver for Bangladesh

Possibilities and Challenges in Rohingya Repatriation: Quest for A New Diplomatic Maneuver for Bangladesh

Introduction:

The Rohingya crisis is one of the most pressing humanitarian and geopolitical challenges in South and Southeast Asia. It is a test of regional and global commitment to justice, political will, and collective diplomacy. A lasting solution requires multilateral engagement that addresses root causes and ensures a safe, dignified, and rights-based return for the Rohingya.

Rooted in decades of discrimination and statelessness, the crisis reached a catastrophic scale following the August 2017 military crackdown in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, which led to the forced displacement of over 740,000 Rohingya refugees into neighboring Bangladesh. The United Nations has described these actions as ‘Textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ and genocide, triggering a wide-ranging international response (The Daily Star, 2017). Bangladesh, while demonstrating commendable humanitarian commitment, now hosts over 1 million Rohingya, mostly in the densely populated Cox’s Bazar district. This has imposed a severe burden on local resources, environment, and security. Despite international support, a sustainable and durable solution remains elusive. Bangladesh opened its arms, offering shelter and safety despite its own challenges. But years have passed, and what began as a humanitarian emergency has hardened into a protracted crisis, one that cries out for justice, resolution, and dignity.

The Rohingya crisis is no longer confined to a bilateral issue between Bangladesh and Myanmar; it has evolved into a regional and global responsibility with implications for human rights, regional stability, and international law. On March 14, 2025, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Dr. Muhammad Yunus shared iftar with Rohingya refugees at Camp 18 in Cox’s Bazar. As part of Guterres’ Ramadan solidarity tour, the visit emphasized the refugees’ desire to return to Myanmar and the need for better camp conditions. Both leaders expressed solidarity, urging international support for a dignified repatriation and warning against aid cuts amid ongoing challenges. The iftar served as a powerful symbol of global commitment to the Rohingya cause, amplifying calls for sustained international involvement and a just resolution to the crisis.

The recent mass uprising in Bangladesh has ushered in a transformative period marked by political transitions, economic uncertainties, and shifting social narratives. These changes are reshaping the nation’s identity and governance structures, prompting a reevaluation of traditional international relations paradigms. One of the most notable shifts is in Bangladesh’s strategic positioning. Moving away from over-dependence on India, the country is now engaging more actively with other global and regional powers. This realignment was evident at the latest BIMSTEC summit, where Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser, Dr. Muhammad Yunus, assumed the Chairmanship of the organization. A significant development during the summit was Myanmar’s agreement announced in a joint press briefing that around 180,000 Rohingya refugees are eligible for repatriation.

Background:

Historical Context:

Arakan, now Rakhine State in Myanmar, lies along the Bay of Bengal and shares a 176-mile border with Bangladesh, separated by the Naf River and the Arakan Yoma mountain range. Historically, it maintained close ties with Bengal, with control over Chittagong shifting between Arakanese, Bengali, and Tripura rulers. Arakan remained an independent kingdom until its annexation by Burma in 1784, according to Phayre (1884). While some claim Aryan settlers first inhabited the region, most scholars believe the Tibeto-Burman Kanyan tribe were the earliest settlers. Arakan has one of the longest recorded histories in Burma, dating back to 2666 BCE.

Islam arrived in Arakan through Arab traders traveling to China, with early signs including the Bundar Mokam mosque in Akyab and the presence of veiled women. From the 10th to 16th centuries, areas like Chittagong and Sandwip alternated between the control of Bengal’s Muslim sultans and Arakanese kings. Piracy and raids by Arakanese forces, often with Portuguese and French support, further intertwined the region’s Muslim and local communities. Muslims from Persia, Arabia, Turkey, and North India settled and gradually integrated, forming the Rohingya, who developed a distinct dialect blending Persian, Urdu, Pashto, Bengali, and Arakanese. Muslim influence increased after the Arakanese king Narmikhila regained his throne in 1430 with help from Bengal, adopting the name Solaiman Shah. Successive rulers followed this practice, and Bengali culture flourished at court. However, the asylum and subsequent execution of Mughal prince Shah Shuja in 1660 led to Mughal retaliation and military campaigns capturing Sandwip, Chittagong, and Ramu by 1666. These incidents further shaped the region’s complex dynamics.

After the Burman conquest in 1785, widespread atrocities and forced labor forced many Muslims to flee to Cox’s Bazar. British colonial rule, following the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26), brought new Bengali settlers and restructured the demographic landscape. During WWII, Rohingyas sided with the British while many Rakhine Buddhists supported Japan, triggering renewed violence and displacement. Post-war, the British promise of a Muslim autonomous zone in Arakan went unfulfilled, leading to the 1948 Mujahid rebellion seeking independence. Though short-lived, it heightened distrust and led to increasing discrimination against Muslims, including loss of jobs and movement restrictions. Operation Nagmin in 1978 triggered the first major Rohingya exodus into Bangladesh, with over 200,000 fleeing. A second wave in 1991 strained Bangladesh–Myanmar relations, although repatriation efforts resolved the crisis within sixteen months. These events underscore the deep-rooted and recurring nature of the Rohingya issue.

The root cause of the Rohingya tragedy is a crisis of identity. Neither the Myanmar junta nor ethnic rebel groups like the Arakan Army (AA) recognize the Rohingya as a legitimate ethnic group and citizen of Myanmar. Instead, they are frequently labelled illegal immigrants from Chattogram (Bangladesh). This lack of recognition deprives the Rohingya of citizenship, leadership, and political agency. While Bangladesh has provided them refuge under the FDMN (Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals) status, educational and developmental opportunities remain minimal, hindering long-term integration or empowerment.

Current situation:

The repatriation process of Rohingya refugees remained virtually stagnant for years. When the refugees first began arriving from Myanmar, both the people and the government of Bangladesh received them with a great degree of sympathy. The government took immediate and effective steps to provide relief, offering temporary shelters, food, medical care, and sanitation facilities. A large number of officials were mobilized to support the relief operations. Eventually, international agencies such as the UNHCR and WFP, along with both local and international NGOs, joined the efforts.

From the outset, however, Bangladeshi policymakers maintained a firm position: the refugees’ stay should be temporary, and they should return to Myanmar as soon as conditions allowed. With limited capacity and resources, the Government of Bangladesh consistently emphasized the need for repatriation and eagerly sought negotiations with Myanmar to facilitate this return. Initially, local communities in Teknaf, Ramu, and Cox’s Bazar responded to the influx with empathy. Yet, as time went on, the growing presence of refugees placed increasing pressure on local society, economy, and the environment. Sympathy eroded, giving way to dissatisfaction and frustration. Violence in the camps, especially during protests against forceful repatriation, contributed to shifting perceptions. The media began portraying the refugees in a negative light—often as aggressive and disorderly. Numerous newspaper articles highlighted the damage to local flora and fauna, particularly deforestation caused by expanding camps, framing the refugee presence as an environmental burden.

The situation became more complex with Myanmar’s frequent border violations amid its anti-insurgency campaign against the Arakan Army in Rakhine State (The Daily Star, 2022). At the same time, growing armed activities by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) within the camps, along with increasing drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and illegal sea migration to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, raised alarm across Bangladesh and the region.

Over time, the humanitarian crisis evolved into a national security concern for Bangladesh. Reports of Rohingyas’ involvement in drug trafficking, human smuggling, gang violence, and other criminal activities became alarmingly frequent. Since 2017, 89 Rohingyas have been killed in gang-related violence, with at least three armed groups competing for control within the camps. The murder of Rohingya leader Mohibullah revealed deepening tensions and the increasing influence of organized crime. So far, 2,363 criminal cases involving Rohingyas have been recorded in Bangladesh, indicating a rising trend in illegal activities. Many Rohingyas reportedly serve as smugglers, intermediaries, or carriers for transnational trafficking networks. In one notable incident in May 2022, a Rohingya man was arrested in Teknaf with 10,000 yaba pills worth approximately Taka 56.2 million. Others have been intercepted while trying to escape via sea. In March, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) rescued 57 Rohingyas who were being trafficked to Malaysia via trawler off the coast of Teknaf—underscoring the growing scale and complexity of the crisis.

Amidst financial strain, the World Food Program (WFP) announced food ration cuts, while U.S. support for the Rohingya was significantly reduced during the Trump administration. Against this backdrop, UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s visit to the camps served as a reassuring gesture. During a heartfelt iftar speech, he pledged to “speak loudly” to world leaders about the need for renewed international support and action, reaffirming the UN’s commitment to the Rohingya cause.

Bangladesh’s past and current diplomatic efforts:

Although Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it upholds the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and draws from its own experience during the 1971 Liberation War, when millions of Bengalis became refugees in India. This legacy imparts a strong moral responsibility to protect the basic rights of refugees. Since the arrival of the Rohingya refugees in 2017, the Government of Bangladesh has extended shelter, food, and relief. This humanitarian effort has been supported by national and international NGOs and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), allowing the country to manage a crisis of unprecedented magnitude. Despite the humanitarian support, Bangladesh’s central policy has consistently been to ensure the ‘quick and safe return’ of the Rohingya to Myanmar. The country sees repatriation as the only durable solution to the crisis, both for the sake of national security and regional stability.

Bangladesh continues to engage Myanmar directly, stressing the importance of mutual cooperation to resolve the Rohingya crisis and facilitate repatriation. At the same time, it seeks support from regional powers like China, India, and ASEAN, as well as global actors such as the U.S., U.K., Russia, South Korea, and Japan—leveraging their ties with Myanmar to build pressure. To counter misinformation, especially claims labeling Rohingyas as “illegal Bengalis,” Bangladesh relies on fact-based diplomacy. It emphasizes humanitarian principles and ensures  that the issue remains rooted in truth, not influenced by geopolitical agendas. Even after Myanmar’s military coup in 2021 and repeated provocations—especially border violations related to the conflict between the junta and the Arakan Army in Rakhine—Bangladesh has retained its peaceful diplomatic posture. The country has officially lodged protests and summoned Myanmar’s ambassador in Dhaka four times. Bangladesh references precedents from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, during which successful negotiations and repatriation agreements were achieved.

Bangladesh’s position is shaped by long-term strategic concerns. It fears that without a timely resolution, global attention on the Rohingya crisis may fade, weakening its diplomatic leverage and leaving it with a prolonged humanitarian burden. Countering Myanmar’s narrative is also key, as false claims portraying Rohingyas as illegal immigrants risk misleading the international community and deepening the refugees’ isolation. Bangladesh remains wary of becoming a demographic “dumping ground” for future Rohingya outflows, especially if conditions in Myanmar worsen. Additionally, it warns that ignoring the crisis could lead to wider regional instability and emerging security threats. Bangladesh firmly believes that regional and international actors must not shirk their humanitarian responsibilities. It calls for sustained international pressure on Myanmar to facilitate the safe, dignified, and voluntary return of the Rohingya people. Only through shared accountability and coordinated diplomacy can a lasting solution be achieved.

Bilateral Agreements on Rohingya Repatriation

Bangladesh and Myanmar have signed several repatriation agreements—most notably in 2017, 2018, and 2019—but none have led to meaningful returns. A key agreement signed on 23 November 2017 set the repatriation to begin by January 22, 2018, with voluntary return and no limit on the number of returnees. Another in January 2018 aimed to complete repatriation by 2020, while a third agreement in August 2019 cleared a list of 3,450 Rohingyas for return out of 55,000, which also failed. Despite multiple meetings, including a third joint working group (JWG) meeting in October 2018, and repatriation plans targeting mid-November that year, none succeeded due to Myanmar’s lack of cooperation, safety guarantees, and the refugees’ mistrust. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 further stalled the process.

In January 2021, Bangladesh proposed a village-based repatriation model during a tripartite virtual meeting with China and Myanmar. Myanmar insisted on beginning with 42,000 verified Rohingyas and demanded compliance with its laws. Although Myanmar agreed to maintain an international presence in Rakhine, a military coup in February 2021 derailed progress once again. During a trilateral meeting arranged by China in early 2021, Myanmar reiterated readiness to receive returnees, but again postponed repatriation citing logistical issues. Since then, Myanmar has delayed bilateral talks and only confirmed 35,000 of 876,000 registered Rohingyas. Bangladesh continues to press for cooperation, but verification delays and Myanmar’s inaction have effectively stalled all repatriation initiatives.

Bangladesh has actively advocated for the implementation of the Kofi Annan Commission Report by Myanmar as a framework for resolving the Rohingya crisis. It has used its diplomatic channels to push for resolutions at the UN General Assembly and its committees, condemning Myanmar’s ongoing human rights violations. Bangladesh has also participated as an observer in UN Security Council (UNSC) discussions to highlight the atrocities committed by the Myanmar regime. Additionally, it has supported legal proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning Myanmar’s alleged crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. On July 7, 2022, the UNSC adopted a resolution without a vote, expressing grave concern over ongoing serious human rights violations in Myanmar, particularly against Rohingya Muslims and other minorities.

Role of Regional players:

India

India is one of the states who is directly affected by the Rohingya refugee influx. Approximately 40,000 Rohingya refugees are estimated to be living in India. They reside in slums and detention camps across various cities, including Jammu, Hyderabad, Nuh, and Delhi. The majority are undocumented. India’s response to the Rohingya crisis reflects a balancing act between humanitarian concerns and strategic interests. While India provided humanitarian aid to Bangladesh and Rohingya camps under “Operation Insaniyat,” its domestic policy has been less sympathetic. The Indian government has labeled Rohingya as illegal immigrants and has sought to deport them, despite concerns about human rights violations. Strategically, India seeks to maintain strong ties with Myanmar to counter Chinese influence and secure its northeastern borders. As part of its “Act East” policy, India has invested in infrastructure projects in Myanmar, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. This strategic alignment has contributed to India’s reluctance to take a strong stance against Myanmar’s military regime. The timing of the 2017 Rohingya crackdown by the Myanmar military appears far from coincidental. It was the same year India expanded the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, transforming it into a regional mega-infrastructure initiative. For the first time, India, China, and Myanmar found themselves in strategic alignment regarding connectivity and economic interests in the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia. The Myanmar government likely saw this emerging trilateral understanding as a geopolitical cushion—buying silence or indifference toward internal actions like the Rohingya crackdown. In South Asian geopolitics, India often perceives Bangladesh’s gains as strategic losses, reflecting a zero-sum mindset that complicates regional cooperation. This perception fosters a form of coercive hegemony, where Bangladesh’s diplomatic or economic successes are scrutinized or resisted by Indian policymakers, especially when they involve China’s participation or regional leadership roles. This antagonism hinders Bangladesh’s autonomy in resolving the Rohingya crisis through diverse partnerships.

China

China has played a complex and often controversial role in the Rohingya crisis. As a key ally and economic partner of Myanmar, China has consistently shielded the Myanmar government from international pressure, including blocking or watering down UN Security Council resolutions. Beijing prioritizes stability and strategic interests in the region, particularly its infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), such as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). While China has facilitated some bilateral repatriation talks between Myanmar and Bangladesh, these have largely been ineffective due to the lack of trust and guarantees of safety for the Rohingya. Critics argue that China’s involvement has been more about conflict management than resolving the underlying issues, and its reluctance to condemn Myanmar’s military actions is seen as undermining international accountability efforts.

Role of International Actors:

United States (USA)

The United States has been one of the most vocal international actors in condemning Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya. It has provided significant humanitarian assistance, contributing over $2 billion since the start of the crisis in 2017 to support Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and vulnerable communities in Myanmar. In March 2022, the U.S. officially designated the military’s actions against the Rohingya as genocide, a move welcomed by human rights organizations. Washington has also imposed targeted sanctions on key Myanmar military leaders and entities under laws like the Global Magnitsky Act. However, critics argue that the U.S. response has been largely rhetorical and symbolic, with limited leverage on the ground to influence Myanmar’s military junta or ensure Rohingya repatriation. Nonetheless, U.S. involvement has been essential in maintaining international pressure, mobilizing aid, and supporting legal accountability efforts at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although the U.S. and other Western nations have imposed sanctions on Myanmar, these measures have had limited impact, partly because of the junta’s economic and strategic insulation via China and Russia. Given that Bangladesh’s economy is stronger than Myanmar’s, Bangladesh holds leverage in bilateral economic cooperation and humanitarian aid diplomacy. Bangladesh should explore ways to convert this leverage into influence, offering economic incentives in exchange for concessions on repatriation.

European Union (EU)

The European Union has played a prominent role in providing humanitarian aid, promoting human rights, and pushing for international justice mechanisms related to the Rohingya crisis. The EU has imposed sanctions on several senior Myanmar military officials and suspended all defense cooperation with the country. Moreover, the EU has supported accountability measures, including fact-finding missions, funding for Rohingya documentation projects, and backing The Gambia’s case at the ICJ. The EU also contributes to humanitarian efforts through agencies like ECHO (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations) and partners such as UNHCR and WFP. However, like the U.S., the EU faces challenges in translating moral and legal positions into tangible political solutions, especially in the absence of strong engagement from regional powers.

Gambia

The Gambia, a small West African nation, made headlines in 2019 by filing a historic case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It accused Myanmar of committing genocide against the Rohingya Muslim minority, citing violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Despite its limited size and resources, The Gambia acted on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), taking a bold step toward holding a state accountable for mass atrocities. The case is still ongoing and has drawn global attention, symbolizing a significant move toward international legal accountability and justice for the Rohingya people.

Response from regional and Int’l organization:

United Nations (UN)

The United Nations has played a central role in addressing the Rohingya crisis, both in documenting human rights abuses and coordinating humanitarian responses. One of its key efforts came through the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, which uncovered compelling evidence suggesting genocidal intent by Myanmar’s military against the Rohingya population. These findings added significant weight to global calls for justice and accountability.

At the forefront of the humanitarian response has been the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Tasked with protecting refugees and stateless individuals, the UNHCR has been deeply involved in supporting Rohingya communities, especially those who fled to neighboring Bangladesh. Working in close partnership with the Bangladeshi government, the agency has played a pivotal role in managing the vast refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar—one of the largest refugee settlements in the world. UNHCR’s efforts have encompassed a wide range of vital services, from providing shelter and healthcare to supporting education and ensuring legal identity protection. The agency has consistently advocated for the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of the Rohingya to Myanmar, while also launching numerous appeals for international funding to sustain humanitarian operations.

However, the UN’s efforts have not been without obstacles. Within Myanmar, the UNHCR has faced significant challenges due to limited access, strict government restrictions, and ongoing resistance from the military regime. Meanwhile, the broader international response has been constrained by political gridlock at the UN Security Council, where vetoes from China and Russia have stifled stronger action. Despite these limitations, the UN and its agencies continue to play a crucial role in seeking justice and delivering aid to a deeply vulnerable population.

In March 2025, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres undertook a significant four-day visit to Bangladesh, marking a pivotal moment in the nation’s diplomatic engagements. Invited by the interim government led by Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus, Guterres aimed to witness firsthand Bangladesh’s ongoing reforms and to spotlight pressing humanitarian concerns, notably the Rohingya refugee crisis. Upon his arrival, Guterres expressed gratitude for the warm reception and reaffirmed the UN’s commitment to supporting Bangladesh’s transitional journey. He met with Chief Adviser Yunus at the state guest house Jamuna, where discussions encompassed the country’s reform agenda, humanitarian initiatives, and collaborative efforts with the UN to address critical issues.

A focal point of Guterres’s visit was his return to the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, home to over a million Rohingya refugees who fled violence in Myanmar. He described the visit as “extremely moving,” emphasizing the refugees’ resilience and the need for continued international support. Participating in an Iftar meal with refugees and host community members, he highlighted Bangladesh’s embodiment of universal values like compassion and generosity. Guterres also acknowledged Bangladesh’s contributions to global challenges, including climate change, development, and peace and security. He lauded the formation of six reform commissions by the interim government, aimed at overhauling public administration, anti-corruption measures, the judiciary, police, the electoral system, and the constitution, in preparation for free and fair general elections. The visit concluded with Guterres attending a photo exhibition at the UN office in Dhaka and engaging with youth and civil society representatives. A joint press conference with Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain and an Iftar hosted by Chief Adviser Yunus marked the end of his stay. Throughout his visit, Guterres emphasized the UN’s steadfast partnership with Bangladesh, expressing readiness to assist in fostering peace, national dialogue, trust, and healing during this transformative period.

From Bangladesh’s perspective, UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s March 2025 visit marked a critical diplomatic milestone. Arriving during a sensitive political transition—following the fall of the Hasina regime and the rise of the interim government under Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus—his visit signaled strong international support for Bangladesh’s reform agenda focused on democracy, transparency, and institutional integrity.

Guterres’s endorsement of the reform process reassured the Bangladeshi public that their demand for accountable governance was heard globally. His visit to the Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar also renewed international attention to Bangladesh’s humanitarian efforts and the urgent need for safe, voluntary repatriation.

At a time when disinformation and anti-Bangladesh narratives, particularly from Indian media, have questioned the legitimacy of the interim government, the UN’s visible support countered diplomatic isolation attempts. Guterres’s visit boosted Bangladesh’s global standing and strengthened its position as a responsible regional actor, committed to democratic renewal and regional cooperation.

ASEAN: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has struggled to present a unified and effective response to the Rohingya crisis due to its non-interference principle and internal divisions. While countries like Malaysia and Indonesia have voiced strong concerns and pushed for more active engagement, others have been more cautious. ASEAN has taken some steps, such as dispatching humanitarian aid and conducting preliminary assessments through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre). However, these efforts have been widely criticized as superficial and Myanmar-centric, focusing on humanitarian aspects without addressing human rights abuses or political accountability. The “ASEAN Way”, based on the principles of non-interference, is seen as an obstacle. Besides Thailand and Indonesia, the limited direct impact of the crisis on most ASEAN members has also likely diminished the political will within the group to tackle the issue robustly. ASEAN’s internal mechanisms have proven inadequate to deal with such a deep-rooted humanitarian and political crisis, raising questions about the bloc’s ability to uphold its regional responsibility in safeguarding human rights.

BIMSTEC: The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), which includes both Bangladesh and Myanmar, was initially viewed as a possible platform for dialogue on the Rohingya crisis. However, its focus remains largely on economic and technical collaboration, not humanitarian or political conflict resolution. Diverging interests among member states and Myanmar’s participation have hindered any unified stance. As a result, BIMSTEC has taken no formal position and has played no active role in addressing the crisis or facilitating repatriation. At the 6th BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok on 04 April 2025, where Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser, Dr. Muhammad Yunus, assumed the Chairmanship, a significant development occurred. Myanmar announced in a joint press briefing that around 180,000 Rohingya refugees are eligible for repatriation, marking a potential shift in Myanmar’s stance on the crisis.

OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation): The OIC has provided political and financial backing for The Gambia’s ICJ case and has consistently advocated for Rohingya rights at international forums.

International NGOs and civil society: Organizations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), CARE International, Brac etc. have been instrumental in documenting human rights abuses and providing medical and legal support to the Rohingya community.

Major Challenges in Repatriation

The protracted Rohingya crisis continues to pose formidable challenges to Bangladesh’s domestic stability, regional diplomacy, and international standing. Despite Bangladesh’s repeated efforts to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of Rohingya refugees, repatriation remains stalled due to a complex interplay of internal and external political dynamics. Between 2018 and 2020, Bangladesh submitted a list of 800,000 Rohingya to Myanmar in six phases. In 2025, the junta government in Myanmar confirmed that only 180,000 individuals on that list were “eligible” for return, leaving the fate of the remaining 650,000–700,000 unresolved. Even for those deemed eligible, no definitive timeline or assurance for repatriation has been established, leaving Bangladesh in a state of strategic uncertainty.

While the recent confirmation from Myanmar can be seen as a diplomatic success for the interim Yunus administration, it is important to acknowledge that repatriation discussions had begun long before. The junta’s previous reluctance and strategic stalling had rendered the process stagnant. However, recent shifts including internal developments in Myanmar and rising pressures along regional borders suggest that the junta may be revisiting its stance. Nevertheless, these signals remain ambiguous. The announcement to take back 180,000 Rohingyas—despite the ground realities—can be viewed as tacit recognition of the Rohingya as citizens. Bangladesh must leverage this admission to push for stronger accountability and implementation guarantees.

A critical and often overlooked obstacle to repatriation is the emerging power of the Arakan Army (AA), a non-state actor that now controls large portions of Rakhine State. The AA’s presence has complicated traditional state-to-state negotiations, compelling Bangladesh to consider new diplomatic strategies. Even if Myanmar’s central government agrees to repatriation, the actual resettlement of Rohingya in Rakhine cannot proceed without the consent of the AA. Given that the junta lacks de facto control over Rakhine, any attempts to return the Rohingya without the AA’s approval would be futile. Relocating the refugees to other parts of Myanmar, amidst an ongoing civil war, appears equally implausible.

Despite the sensitivity, Bangladesh has occasionally communicated with the AA and must now seriously assess the strategic value of engaging them further. Engaging with a non-state actor is not tantamount to endorsing it; rather, it may be the only viable pathway to resolve an increasingly intractable crisis. In this context, it is essential to critically examine the AA’s stated intentions. In a past interview, Maj. Gen. Twan Mrat Naing, the leader of the AA, claimed recognition of the Rohingyas’ rights. However, subsequent actions contradicted that claim—Rohingyas reportedly faced similar oppression under AA control, which contributed to a fresh wave of refugee influx into Bangladesh in 2024. Any potential negotiation with the Arakan Army must acknowledge that its military strength and political space are heavily backed by China—especially through arms supplies. Thus, engaging the AA without considering Beijing’s geopolitical interests would be strategically shortsighted.

At the same time, Bangladesh faces increasing pressure to stop the ongoing influx of Rohingya refugees. While 64,718 Rohingyas entered the country in 2024 alone, smaller groups continue to arrive regularly. Historically, the absence of strict border closures raises questions about the feasibility of curbing future arrivals. Simultaneously, Bangladesh has not adopted alternative strategies beyond repatriation. There is a notable absence of a national refugee policy or a specific legal framework for addressing the Rohingya issue, and the interim government’s position on this matter remains unclear.

Domestically, the situation is further complicated by economic and social pressures, particularly in Cox’s Bazar. Despite international recognition of the hardship, donor fatigue has resulted in significant funding cuts. The global community has failed to respond adequately. While countries have commended Bangladesh’s efforts—such as developing Bhasan Char Island to improve living conditions—they have fallen short in offering substantive support, such as resettling refugees or ensuring consistent aid.

Meanwhile, international actors appear more invested in regional stability and great-power rivalries than in humanitarian outcomes. China and India maintain deep geopolitical and geo-economic interests in Rakhine, and their actions reflect strategic calculations rather than moral imperatives. The U.S., too, has offered humanitarian support through USAID, but this is widely seen as an effort to counterbalance China’s influence in the region. In this environment, multilateral bodies like the UN, OIC, and EU have been largely ineffective, offering only rhetorical condemnation and minimal tangible support.

Amid these geopolitical and institutional shortcomings, Bangladesh must act decisively. The Rohingya issue has the potential to destabilize the broader South Asian region, and inaction will only exacerbate the crisis. Bangladesh must strategically utilize all its diplomatic channels, leveraging both state and non-state avenues, to initiate meaningful negotiations. There is no “right time” to address a refugee crisis of this magnitude—what is required is political will, strategic clarity, and a humane approach to protecting over a million stateless individuals while safeguarding Bangladesh’s long-term national interests. In case repatriation fails or remains indefinitely stalled, Bangladesh needs a comprehensive alternative plan, like educational and economic opportunities for Rohingyas to foster self-reliance.

Towards a new diplomatic maneuver

Bangladesh’s foreign policy strategy for addressing the Rohingya crisis should adopt a multi-pronged approach, balancing public diplomacy, legal action, regional alliances, and engagement with non-traditional partners. Public diplomacy can shape global narratives, while legal diplomacy through international courts, like the ICJ, can hold Myanmar accountable. Bangladesh should also revive regional frameworks like SAARC and BIMSTEC to strengthen regional cooperation. By leveraging global human rights discourse and South-South cooperation, Bangladesh can build broader international support. Moreover, Bangladesh must focus on refugee management within its borders, improving governance structures and engaging civil society and diaspora networks to advocate for refugees.

For long-term solutions, repatriation must be part of a broader strategy that addresses the root causes of persecution and statelessness. Past attempts have failed, showing that temporary returns without systemic reforms in Myanmar only delay future displacement. Bangladesh’s diplomatic restraint, particularly in pursuing repatriation through dialogue despite Myanmar’s repeated violations, is commendable. The Kofi Annan Commission’s recommendations provide a path toward ensuring the rights and integration of the Rohingya in Myanmar. Identifying legitimate Rohingya representatives, especially those in Europe with democratic exposure, can foster inclusive dialogue and contribute to a just solution. As a law-abiding nation, Bangladesh remains bound by international legal principles like non-refoulement, which prohibits returning individuals to a country where they face persecution or serious harm. Thus, it must continue to resist any forced repatriation unless conditions in Myanmar significantly improve.

Lastly, Bangladesh must engage with the Arakan Army, which currently has de facto control over Rakhine. Diplomatic discussions with Myanmar alone will not yield meaningful outcomes. Given Bangladesh’s proximity and leverage, direct engagement with the Arakan Army could be key to a pragmatic negotiation process that leads to a lasting solution for the Rohingya. In light of this reality, Bangladesh must pursue a dual-track diplomatic strategy:

• Track One diplomacy with the central Myanmar government, and
• Track Two diplomacy with non-state actors such as the Arakan Army.

However, such engagement brings its own risks. If the AA, emboldened by military gains, seeks legitimacy in exchange for cooperation, the situation may spiral into a geopolitical quagmire. Bangladesh, as an established state actor dealing with a non-state actor like the Arakan Army, must keep the United Nations as a mediator. The UN’s role can help ensure impartiality in negotiations, provide legitimacy to the process, and facilitate dialogue between Bangladesh and the Arakan Army. Given the complex geopolitical and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis, the UN can offer the necessary support in ensuring that the interests of both Bangladesh and the Rohingya are protected, while also fostering a platform for international cooperation and pressure on Myanmar to implement meaningful reforms. The UN’s involvement can also help bridge the gaps between state and non-state actors and promote a broader, multilateral approach to resolving the crisis.

Any potential negotiation with the Arakan Army must acknowledge that its military strength and political space are heavily backed by China—especially through arms supplies. Thus, engaging the AA without considering Beijing’s geopolitical interests would be strategically shortsighted.

Conclusion

The Rohingya crisis remains a complex humanitarian challenge with significant implications for Bangladesh’s stability, regional diplomacy, and international relations. Despite Bangladesh’s efforts for repatriation, the process has stalled due to Myanmar’s reluctance, internal political dynamics, and the growing influence of the Arakan Army. Repatriation must be part of a broader strategy addressing the root causes of the crisis, including systemic reforms in Myanmar and the protection of Rohingya rights.

Bangladesh should adopt a multi-pronged diplomatic approach, engaging both state and non-state actors, while leveraging international support and civil society networks. The UN must play a central role in mediating between all parties, ensuring impartiality, and providing legitimacy to negotiations. Although the path forward is challenging, Bangladesh’s diplomatic resilience and strategic clarity are key to addressing the crisis. A comprehensive, multilateral approach is essential for achieving a lasting solution and ensuring a future where the Rohingya can return to Myanmar with dignity and rights.

References:

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