India-Pakistan conflict and its broader security implications for Bangladesh
If the situation demands, Bangladesh must be able to act immediately. That’s my key point. Bangladesh must reach a strategic level of readiness, where if a threat emerges, it can execute necessary actions without delay. That readiness is essential. Still, the primary focus should remain on economic development. And for that, Bangladesh needs constructive engagement with India, the United States, and China.
Shafi Md Mostofa (PhD) is a distinguished scholar in security studies, with extensive research interests in political Islam, authoritarianism, modern South Asian history and politics, and international relations, particularly in relation to the clash of civilizations. He currently serves as an Associate Professor of World Religions and Culture at the University of Dhaka and is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Democracy Institute at the Central European University, Hungary.As part of its initiative to interview scholars on national and regional security issues, the Dacca Institute of Research and Analytics engaged with Shafi Md Mostofa, who shared his valuable insights regarding the India-Pakistan conflict and its broader security implications for Bangladesh. This interview was conducted by Tamim Muntasir, a researcher at daira.
Thank you, sir, for connecting with us. Today, we’d like to have a conversation on the Indo-Pak conflict, its implications for Bangladesh, and South Asian regional politics. We’ve observed that countries with nuclear weapons tend to avoid direct conflict due to the threat of mutually assured destruction. Historically, this understanding between India and Pakistan acted as a barrier to full-scale war. However, recently, we’ve seen large-scale attacks in Kashmir from both sides. What is your take on the nuclear deterrence theory in the context of current and future geopolitical realities? How do you analyze the present trend?
Certainly. It has long been an established idea that nuclear weapons deter full-scale warfare in the post–Cold War era. To this day, nuclear deterrence theory is still holding. If we analyze international politics from a realist perspective and treat theoretical assumptions as truths, we see that there is no precedent for humanity discovering a weapon and not using it. Looking at the overall state of geopolitics: Russia is engaged in ongoing conflict. They attacked Ukraine, and Ukraine, in response, is seeking alignment with NATO.
Turning our attention to this region, India and Pakistan had long adhered to nuclear deterrence. But for the first time since 1966, they have suspended all treaties, especially the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan sees this as an existential threat. In turn, Pakistan suspended the Shimla Agreement. It appears that nuclear deterrence may not be effective this time. Meanwhile, China is gradually rising as a regional hegemon in the Indo-Pacific, and the United States is not content with dominance only in the Western Hemisphere—it seeks to exert global influence. So, this is no longer a simple power struggle between India, China, and Pakistan. It involves global hegemonic powers like China and the U.S.
Therefore, we must analyze conflicts in the Indo-Pacific from a global perspective. It feels like this region is slowly becoming a hotspot, with multiple nuclear powers involved—China, India, and Pakistan. It’s very difficult to predict, but tensions are rising. If this continues for some time, and liberal peace-building fails, if international liberalism collapses, then for the sake of survival—though not immediately—we might see full-scale war. Again, it’s hard to say with certainty, but the tensions are growing. The Indo-Pacific region is also becoming increasingly strained as relations among countries deteriorate.
We’ve seen that after the Second World War, the United Nations was formed, and nation-states were established through treaties, which helped strengthen international relations. Conflicts were generally resolved through these agreements. Now, with two powers suspending two major treaties—and given that they have never engaged in such large-scale conflicts before—do you think that, on an international level, nations are losing faith in treaties? What might be the implications of that?
That’s exactly what I was trying to say—this is the failure of liberal peace in international politics. If liberal peace becomes ineffective, and states begin to develop their capabilities from a purely realist standpoint, and if the balance of power breaks down, then full-scale nuclear warfare might become a possibility. Many analysts believe this risk is growing. Take the recent incident involving Iran and Israel. What was their main goal? To destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The U.S. claimed they succeeded in doing that. At this moment, our traditional understanding of sovereignty is being challenged. Sovereignty now seems to mean having nuclear power.
We are at a point where liberal peace is failing.
So, being a state is no longer enough?
No, the nation alone is no longer enough. The idea of state sovereignty is slowly becoming a farce—it’s turning into a hollow concept. Because if you don’t have nuclear weapons—if you don’t have nukes—you don’t truly have sovereignty. It’s very plain and simple: if you have them, then you have sovereignty. So, what does that mean? It means that the business of statehood, the world order under U.S. leadership—what is the foundational principle of that order? Liberalism. Liberal peace. And what are the basic instruments of liberal peace? Treaties. The idea that nations will negotiate with one another to minimize conflict. But what’s happening to those mechanisms of minimization? They’re slowly being dismantled.
What will be the result of that dismantling? Simply: “We have nukes.” And if that’s the basis, how will problems be mitigated? We are gradually moving toward a confrontational global environment, and the liberal world order is slowly collapsing. As a result, negotiating peace is becoming increasingly difficult. Now, many states will stop believing in it. They will no longer trust in diplomacy, dialogue, or peace-making through treaties. The next step is power maximization. If Iran is given space right now, what will it do? Its primary objective will be to accelerate its nuclear program. And not just Iran—I believe every country that feels existentially threatened will realize that without nuclear weapons, there is no sovereignty. So they will pursue nuclear weapons immediately. This will lead to a global competition for power maximization. Why? Because states now feel threatened by those that already possess nuclear capabilities. It’s very plain and simple. Internationally, state sovereignty is under threat. Liberalism—and the liberal world order—is also under threat. And this threat is not a good sign. At this point, everyone is talking about power maximization. What does that mean? It means maximizing military power.
If Iran had 5,000 missiles, it could claim the capacity to continue a war indefinitely.
And this is where the world is heading—States are now giving increasing attention to military power. Just look at Poland and other countries: their military budgets are skyrocketing. Because now, every state is trying to become a hegemon. We are slowly moving toward a more unstable world. Liberal peace-building and liberalism are collapsing. And that is not good news for us.
In conclusion, we can say that the Indus Waters Treaty has been cancelled. That means, for Pakistan, it now feels justified to take any action. Similarly, on the Line of Control, the Shimla Agreement has been suspended. So, from India’s side, they might also feel justified to act as they wish. In essence, there are now no legal restraints between the two.
Exactly. They are no longer bound by any treaty or international law to act with restraint. So, even for minor reasons, a new escalation or conflict could easily arise.
And that escalation could be much more intense than the current situation—because both sides will feel they have ample justification, since they are no longer constrained by treaties. As states, they could launch conflicts on any scale they choose. So, it seems this could have significant implications for broader South Asian security.
And not just that—coalitions are becoming increasingly important. Pakistan already shares China’s air defense system. That means they will likely strengthen their position through such alliances. For a long time, Iran avoided deploying Russia’s air defense system. But now, Iran will likely seek to maximize its security by accumulating as much power as possible and forming alliances. These developments are not good signs. They suggest an increasing polarization. If China and Pakistan consolidate as a regional power bloc, India will also respond—because India is part of the Quad and has direct military cooperation with the United States. Naturally, India will also aim to maximize its strategic position.
We know you’ve long been a critic of the “clash of civilizations” theory. But in the context of recent geopolitics, we saw that during the last India–Pakistan conflict, Turkey openly supported Pakistan. The Turkish defense minister even claimed that India’s equipment was faulty and easily beatable. Meanwhile, Israel has voiced support for India, arguing that Pakistan must be neutralized for peace to prevail. So, do you think we’re witnessing a re-emergence of the “clash of civilizations” in today’s geopolitics?
No, this is not a clash of civilizations in the way Huntington described it. He divided the world into five distinct civilizational blocs, but that’s not how things are unfolding. Instead, the world is functioning along two broad lines:
- One led by China and Russia
- The other led by the U.S. and its allies in the Western Hemisphere
This is a bipolar world order, not a civilizational clash. What we are seeing is strategic balancing between these two blocs. For instance, although it may appear that Turkey is siding with Pakistan, remember—Turkey is a NATO member. By law, Turkey is obligated to support NATO’s interests, not Pakistan’s. If Pakistan’s actions align with NATO’s interests, then Turkey might assist. But otherwise, Turkey cannot act independently in Pakistan’s favor.
Didn’t Turkey fight on the side of the U.S. in Syria?
Exactly. That’s the point. Turkey, as a NATO member, must align its actions with NATO interests. On the other hand, the relationship between India and Israel is clear—they are both part of the broader U.S.-Israel strategic lobby, and Israel is also aligned with the Quad. So their support for India is expected. The global structure is becoming increasingly clear: The world is heading toward a bipolar order. This warlike tension will only intensify. If these countries had acted more cautiously, things might have played out differently. But now, they’re not slowing down. Iran, for example, is likely to sign a military treaty with Russia soon. They have avoided doing so for a long time, but if they sense any opportunity or space, they will proceed. And likely with China as well. They will form that alliance.
While we’re on Huntington’s ideas—he suggested a possible “Sino-Islamic” civilization would emerge to challenge the West. Today, within the liberal world order, we do see a kind of China-Iran alignment. Do you think this reflects Huntington’s idea?
No, not really. Turkey, for instance, is not aligning with this so-called “Sino-Islamic alliance.” That theory doesn’t hold up here. There’s no scenario where all Islamic countries are united against the West. Just look at Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq—aside from Iran, most Muslim-majority states are cooperating with the West. So, we don’t see the kind of civilizational conflict that Huntington predicted.
So future conflict will be centered around a China-led world order, with a Russia-China-Iran bloc on one side and an India-U.S. bloc on the other?
Exactly. These are the true competitors. Muslims as a whole are not a threat in this framework.
So it’s not a civilizational question?
No, it’s not about civilization. It’s about interests. It’s about bipolarity. That’s what’s driving today’s global politics.
Sir, referring to your earlier work—during a recent visit to China, Professor Muhammad Yunus said that Bangladesh must act as a guardian of the Bay of Bengal and assert its claims. At the same time, you’re warning that the global situation is volatile and escalation can happen at any time. So, in terms of self-defense, how should Bangladesh respond? In many of your writings, you’ve argued that Bangladesh should focus more on economic development rather than pursuing defense treaties. But in light of today’s geopolitics, do you think Bangladesh’s security architecture needs to be redefined—not viewed in binary terms?
That’s a very important question. In my view, there are two countries that are crucial for Bangladesh: one is India. No country can live peacefully while maintaining a poor relationship with its neighbors. By default, a neighbor has the power to impact your sovereignty and influence your destiny. India is a critical variable in determining whether Bangladesh will thrive or struggle. There’s no example in the world where a country has prospered while being at odds with its immediate neighbors. This applies equally to both Bangladesh and India.
Currently, Bangladesh’s main problem is its economic crisis. To address this, three powers are central:
- The United States—as a single state, it plays a significant role in Bangladesh’s economy.
- China and India—both are crucial for Bangladesh’s economic development.
For now, I believe Bangladesh should pursue a balancing strategy—but not the outdated “friendship to all, malice toward none” approach. Instead, this has to be interest-based, conducted on equal footing. Bangladesh should build good relationships with all players based on national interest. However, if there is any security threat, the country must consider alternative options. Bangladesh lacks robust security mechanisms. It does not even possess a single missile. It has personnel who can fight, but not the equipment to defend itself against major powers like India or China. Given this limitation, the priority should be economic development and relationship-building. But strategic contingency planning must be in place. No need to act prematurely or antagonistically, but the option should always exist. Bangladesh must put economic interest first, and engage with others based on fairness and equality.
if Bangladesh begins developing its defense capabilities, and starts redefining its security architecture—acquiring equipment and related systems—won’t that create geopolitical pressure on Bangladesh?
No. As long as Bangladesh does not formally enter any military bloc and maintains an economic-interest–driven foreign policy, it can gauge threats as they emerge. There’s no need for preemptive measures. But Bangladesh must build the capacity to respond if an existential threat arises. And in that case, it should align with those who possess nuclear capabilities. That’s very important. You need nuclear backing to protect your sovereignty.
Does Bangladesh need some form of security assurance?
Not formal assurance, but functional working relationships. For economic progress, India, the U.S., and China are all important. Bangladesh should deal with them as an independent state, not as a subordinate or vassal. Since independence, Bangladesh has never truly conducted foreign policy as a sovereign actor. It has often accepted humiliating compromises. That needs to change. Bangladesh must gradually develop its own national strategy, built around its own interests. If future situations demand different choices, Bangladesh should have the flexibility to do what’s best for itself. The global system offers multiple options. But for now, Bangladesh should not engage in military alignments.
We see that both the U.S. and India are members of the Quad. But often, India does not align with U.S. interests. In the recent conflict, there was a U.S.-mediated ceasefire, and we even saw renewed U.S.-Pakistan relations. Military officials met with President Trump. The U.S. and Pakistan hadn’t had a good relationship for some time. Do you think U.S. policy is shifting slightly back toward Pakistan? And how should we interpret America’s role here?
The U.S. is undoubtedly the biggest global player. Now, where does realism in international relations come from? From human nature—the tendency for self-interest and shifting priorities. That’s how foreign policy operates. Why would we expect a country to always behave in the same way? We often say: There are no permanent enemies in international relations—only permanent interests. So, of course countries will constantly review their strategies. They should. This is not about ideology. If it were, then how could Iran be allied with Russia? Or how could the U.S. ally with parts of the Islamic world? Ideological alliances are utopian. The real world is driven by interests.
States are extremely opportunistic. They continuously assess how to maximize their benefit. It’s a constant negotiation process. When we talk about U.S.-India relations, it’s just that—a negotiation. India has nuclear weapons. It has the capacity to act as a regional hegemon. So India wants the U.S. to acknowledge that leadership in South Asia. The message is: “Whatever you do in the Western Hemisphere, go ahead. But if you want to operate in South Asia, you must consider our interests.” That’s clear. Even if the U.S. improves ties with Pakistan, it’s not about choosing sides. It’s still a strategic negotiation based on interests—not betrayal.
One final question, sir. We’ve seen that regional organizations in South Asia like SAARC and BIMSTEC are largely dysfunctional. Bangladesh has expressed interest in joining ASEAN, looking toward Southeast Asia. But Pakistan and India remain conflicting regional powers. Aligning with one may hinder balance with the other. So, what kind of alternative security alliances or regional opportunities can Bangladesh pursue in South and Southeast Asia?
First of all, SAARC is dead. It’s not coming back. Second, India has been trying to revive BIMSTEC, which centers around the Bay of Bengal. In this initiative, Pakistan is excluded, which suits India. India has invested a lot of resources into rejuvenating BIMSTEC. Myanmar is also part of it. From India’s perspective, it is the only nuclear power in this region, which allows it to demonstrate regional hegemony through BIMSTEC. This motivation will remain.
If Bangladesh can negotiate effectively, it can benefit from both BIMSTEC and ASEAN. To return to what I said earlier: Bangladesh lacks the military power to act assertively. Countries like China have control over their economies and can now afford military expansion. Bangladesh cannot—not yet. But over time, Bangladesh can work toward slow, steady military development. For now, the focus must remain on economic growth. And toward that goal, Bangladesh should work diplomatically with both BIMSTEC and ASEAN to maximize economic benefits.
Could this be a viable proposal? That Bangladesh shifts its focus away from South Asia—where India and Pakistan dominate the regional organizations—and instead looks toward Southeast Asia as an alternative for economic or security alliances. How beneficial or harmful would such a shift be for Bangladesh?
Bangladesh doesn’t need to actively participate in any security alliance right now. I don’t think that’s necessary at this stage. However, these kinds of strategic thoughts and negotiation possibilities must be kept in mind. They should be present in the framework of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. But it should not be a priority right now.
Then, how should Bangladesh address its security vulnerabilities?
Through the deliberation and strategic planning I just mentioned. The state must assess and objectively measure its security risks. If the relevant state agencies determine that a threat exists, then Bangladesh will need to act accordingly. It must be a situational decision, made in response to real-time national interests. But if Bangladesh jumps into any security mechanism prematurely, it could face significant challenges.
So your argument is: this idea should be kept in mind, but developed gradually—giving it the necessary time?
Exactly. But also, if the situation demands, Bangladesh must be able to act immediately. That’s my key point. Bangladesh must reach a strategic level of readiness, where if a threat emerges, it can execute necessary actions without delay. That readiness is essential. Still, the primary focus should remain on economic development. And for that, Bangladesh needs constructive engagement with India, the United States, and China. But this will only be possible under a government that truly unites the nation—a government with full legitimacy that brings 100% of the population together and can lead the country forward. This has been missing for the past 16 years. What we’ve seen instead is geopolitical expediency—where ruling parties have played with the superpowers, leveraging global tensions for their own political gain.
That should not happen.
A state must be united. Look at Iran: when the nation is united, they can face external threats together. In contrast, in Bangladesh, political divisions are so deep that if, for example, a national security crisis occurred—say, five missiles were launched—different political parties might see it as an opportunity to seize power. That kind of division means the state would fail, and one party could use the situation for their own gain. So I repeat: to move forward in any meaningful way, Bangladesh needs to become an inclusive state. If a father can’t maintain good relationships among his own children, how can he hold the family together? In the same way, national unity and solidarity are preconditions for any strategic progress. Only a government with true legitimacy—born from a fair and inclusive election—can unite the people and serve the nation’s best interests. We hope that in the upcoming elections, such a government will emerge—one that seeks to unite, not divide—and that will better serve the interests of the Bangladeshi state and its people.
Thank you very much for your time.
It was a pleasure speaking with you.