Exploring New Possibilities: Strengthening Sino-Bangladesh Strategic Relations in a Post-Uprising Era
Introduction
Bangladesh and China have shared a robust diplomatic and economic relationship since the formal establishment of ties in 1975. This year, 2025, the China-Bangladesh relationship reaches a significant milestone, celebrating 50 years of diplomatic ties. This enduring partnership, characterized by mutual respect, strategic cooperation, and shared growth, is navigating a complex landscape of challenges and opportunities. Over the years, Beijing has emerged as Dhaka’s largest trading partner, a key investor in infrastructure, and a dominant supplier of military equipment. The two nations have expanded cooperation under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with major projects such as the Padma Bridge Rail Link, Payra Power Plant, and Karnaphuli Tunnel being funded by Chinese investments. Under Sheikh Hasina’s regime, Bangladesh has balanced strong economic ties with China while balancing a geopolitical tilt toward India. Like many authoritarian governments, Hasina has leveraged China’s flexible loan terms and arms trade, avoiding the restrictions often associated with loans from the World Bank or IMF. China’s non-interference policy has made it an appealing partner for such financial and defense collaborations (RAND Corporation, 2022).
The geopolitical trajectory of Bangladesh experienced a paradigm shift during the July uprising & ouster of Sheikh Hasina on 5 August and was replaced by an interim government led by Nobel laureate economist Dr. Muhammad Yunus. It is worth mentioning that China welcomed Bangladesh’s interim government without any delay, reaffirming its non-interference policy and respect for Bangladesh’s sovereignty. Expressing a commitment to their long-standing friendship, China continues to prioritize deepening bilateral cooperation and advancing their strategic partnership, grounded in mutual respect and good neighborliness ( Ministry of Foreign affairs China, 2024).
Dhaka’s foreign policy during the interim government has undergone a noticeable shift, transitioning from ‘Hasina’s increasing dependence on India’ to an ‘emphasis on developing relations with the United States (US), the European Union, and regional partners.’ A major shift in South Asia’s geopolitical landscape is expected following the regime change in strategically important Bangladesh. A key aspect of this transformation was the Hasina administration’s growing reliance on India, which led to China’s discontent. This frustration became evident during Hasina’s visit to Beijing in July, coinciding with the onset of opposition movements against her rule. Expecting substantial financial aid, she was instead met with China’s refusal, prompting an early departure.
In response to regional tensions involving India and the US, China has intensified its engagement with Bangladesh through various diplomatic, economic, and strategic initiatives, particularly in the aftermath of the government’s fall in Dhaka. Since 2009, Bangladesh’s ‘India-friendly diplomatic posture’ has been a point of concern for Chinese policymakers. Consequently, in the post-Hasina period, China is strategically increasing its focus on Bangladesh, aiming to counter India’s influence in South Asia. As part of a broader regional strategy, Beijing is actively working to expand its diplomatic foothold in both Bangladesh and India, reinforcing its presence in Dhaka amid shifting power dynamics.
The recent mass uprising in Bangladesh has served as a catalyst for an unprecedented period of change. Political transitions, economic uncertainties, and evolving social narratives are reshaping the country’s identity and governance structures. In this environment, the traditional paradigms of international relations are being questioned and redefined. In particular, the strategic relationship between Bangladesh and China is emerging as a pivotal factor in determining the future trajectory of the region. Historically, Bangladesh’s engagement with China has been characterized by pragmatic cooperation, with China often serving as a crucial partner in trade, investment, and security. However, the post-uprising era presents an opportunity to reinvigorate and recalibrate this bilateral relationship to better serve the national interest.
With the Chief Advisor of the Interim Government of Bangladesh slated to visit China between March 26 and March 29, 2025, there is an added impetus to reframe the narrative surrounding Sino-Bangladesh ties. The visit is anticipated to mark a milestone in bilateral engagement, with Chinese officials, including Ambassador Yao Wen, describing it as a significant and productive step forward. Such high-level interactions underscore the growing importance of aligning strategic, economic, and political interests in a manner that transcends traditional alliances. The meeting between Yunus and Xi will focus on issues of bilateral interest. Dhaka aims to elevate its relationship with Beijing to a new level, with the goal of transforming Bangladesh into a manufacturing hub. This visit marks a significant milestone in the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Dynamics of China-Bangladesh Relations Post-Sheikh Hasina Era
China and Bangladesh have fostered a dynamic relationship, strengthened by their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation. Under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership, Bangladesh has balanced strong economic ties with China while maintaining a geopolitical inclination toward India. Like many authoritarian governments, Hasina has leveraged China’s flexible loan terms and arms trade, avoiding the restrictions often associated with loans from the World Bank or IMF. China’s non-interference policy has made it an appealing partner for such financial and defense collaborations.
China’s Non-Interference in Internal Politics
China’s relationship with Bangladesh has consistently been shaped by strategic and economic interests rather than political ideology. Unlike Western nations or India, which often express concerns over Bangladesh’s democratic process and internal politics, China has maintained a non-interventionist stance. Prioritizing stability and economic cooperation over political affiliations, Beijing has remained engaged with Dhaka regardless of leadership changes, focusing on trade, infrastructure, and development projects. This approach has been particularly evident in recent years. While countries like the United States and India exercised caution, China immediately welcomed the newly formed Yunus-led interim government. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, in its regular briefing, reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening collaboration with the new administration, expressing support for its governance reforms. This reflects China’s broader strategy of engaging with Bangladesh based on pragmatic interests rather than political transitions.
Bangladesh’s political landscape has witnessed significant shifts, with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League both pursuing diplomatic engagements with Beijing. The BNP, in particular, has actively sought to reinforce ties with China, sending delegations hosted by the Communist Party to explore China’s economic progress, technological innovations, governance model, and cultural development. This outreach emphasises China’s increasing role as a strategic partner, particularly at a time when the Awami League has seen its political influence wane following the collapse of its ruling government. Given the absence of a democratically elected administration in Dhaka, Beijing has recalibrated its approach to prioritize inclusive engagement with all political entities, ensuring continuity in its economic and geopolitical agenda.
Deepening strategic engagement, China is actively fostering high-level dialogue with Bangladesh’s new administration. This month, Bangladesh will participate in the Boao Forum for Asia, marking the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two nations. In a significant diplomatic gesture, Chinese President Xi Jinping has sent a special flight for Chief Advisor Dr. Yunus’s visit, underlining Bangladesh’s strategic importance to China. This high-level engagement represents the first direct diplomatic interaction between Beijing and the head of Bangladesh’s interim leadership. The upcoming visit carries substantial economic and diplomatic weight. The agenda includes expanding Bangladeshi exports to China, attracting greater foreign direct investment, and negotiating extended repayment periods for Chinese loans. Additionally, both nations are set to sign approximately a dozen memorandums of understanding (MoUs) covering critical sectors such as infrastructure, energy, and economic cooperation. These agreements are expected to solidify Bangladesh’s position as a key partner in China’s long-term regional strategy.
Economic and Trade Cooperation
Despite the shift in the political landscape of Bangladesh, China’s position remains unchanged. China has consistently emphasized that it does not seek to influence leadership transitions but focuses on safeguarding its investments and strategic interests in the region. This pragmatic approach ensures stability in China-Bangladesh relations, allowing China to achieve its long-term geopolitical and economic goals.
One of the strongest pillars of the China-Bangladesh relationship is economic cooperation, particularly in infrastructure financing. China has emerged as a cornerstone investor in Bangladesh, with more than $3 billion in investments. Key projects like the Padma Bridge Rail Link and Dhaka Metro Rail underscore the transformative impact of Chinese capital on Bangladesh’s infrastructure development. As Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, China accounts for over $24 billion in bilateral trade. Ongoing discussions for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) aim to address trade imbalances and further enhance Bangladeshi exports. China’s financial and engineering assistance in Bangladesh has been pivotal in the implementation of mega infrastructure projects, particularly in sectors such as power generation, transportation, and connectivity. For the past two decades, China has been a reliable partner, consistently working to strengthen economic and development ties with Bangladesh. Chinese firms operate within the country alongside Bangladeshi businesses, facilitating infrastructural growth.
In contrast, India, despite being an important strategic partner for Bangladesh, cannot match China’s financial capabilities. Since 2010, India has pledged around $8 billion in credit lines to Bangladesh, but disbursement has been slow, hindered by bureaucratic delays that have stalled project implementation. China’s unmatched lending capacity positions it as a dominant player in Bangladesh’s infrastructure development.
During the recent visit by the interim government’s foreign affairs advisor, discussions centered on restructuring debt owed to China. Bangladesh requested a reduction in the interest rate on Preferential Buyers Credit (PBC) and Government Concession Loans (GCL) from 2-3 percent to 1 percent, alongside an extension of the repayment period from 20 to 30 years. In response, China showed a positive stance, agreeing to extend the repayment period by 10 years to 30 years and expressing a willingness to consider lowering the interest rate. China also assured continued support for Bangladesh’s development, including its graduation from the Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2026. As part of this support, China pledged to maintain duty-free and quota-free access for Bangladeshi products for three years post-graduation. Additionally, China reaffirmed its commitment to supporting economic projects that contribute to the livelihoods of the Bangladeshi people, ensuring that its partnership remains beneficial to Bangladesh’s long-term development goals.
Defense Cooperation
In recent years, China has become a key partener in enhancing Bangladesh’s defense capabilities, particularly in the naval sector. In 2016, China supplied two submarines to Bangladesh, marking a significant milestone in the country’s maritime security. This was complemented by China’s support in constructing the Sheikh Hasina submarine base, further strengthening Bangladesh’s naval infrastructure. Additionally, China has continued to provide naval training, reinforcing the country’s maritime defense framework.
China has become Bangladesh’s largest supplier of military equipment, providing tanks, aircraft, and naval vessels, which reflects the deep strategic trust between the two nations. Militarily, China has long been the dominant supplier of defense apparatus to Bangladesh, accounting for more than 70% of the country’s military imports. The interim leadership in Bangladesh has expressed its intention to further strengthen defense cooperation with Beijing, although some Dhaka-based diplomats speculate that China may refrain from taking significant steps in the military field until an elected government is in place.
Bangladesh’s reliance on China for military equipment spans all categories of weapons, despite global concerns regarding the quality of Chinese arms. In recent years, however, several Western countries, including the United States and Turkey, have joined the ranks of suppliers. The primary reasons for Bangladesh’s preference for Chinese military equipment include cost savings, technical support, and a long-term defense strategy. China’s provision of technical assistance and training has also been critical in enhancing Bangladesh’s weapons management capabilities, contributing to the country’s growing defense infrastructure.
Nonetheless, some security analysts have raised concerns about Bangladesh’s growing dependence on China for arms and have suggested the need for diversification to mitigate the risks associated with over-reliance on a single supplier. Despite these concerns, China remains eager to maintain its military arms trade with Bangladesh for both strategic and economic reasons, particularly within the context of South Asia’s geopolitics.
Geopolitical & Strategic Cooperation
As global and regional powers intensify their strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific, Bangladesh has found itself at the center of a shifting geopolitical landscape. The China-India and China-U.S. rivalries have heightened Beijing’s concerns regarding Dhaka’s foreign policy alignments. In light of this, China has sought to deepen its influence in Bangladesh through a range of global initiatives. These include inviting Bangladesh to join the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). While Bangladesh expressed its willingness to examine these proposals, it has not yet committed to full participation. In addition to these initiatives, China reaffirmed its respect for Bangladesh’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, emphasizing its support for Bangladesh’s stability, reforms, and development efforts. Both countries also agreed to continue cooperation under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vital component of China’s broader regional infrastructure diplomacy. The BRI, along with other strategic projects like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM), and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR), highlights China’s efforts to integrate Bangladesh into its regional development plans.
The recent diplomatic deadlock between Bangladesh and India has provided China with an opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Dhaka. India has traditionally viewed China as a threat to its strategic interests in South Asia, and China’s growing influence in Bangladesh has faced consistent opposition from New Delhi, especially since the Hasina administration. With Bangladesh’s largest trading partner now being China and Beijing serving as a key supplier of military equipment, Bangladesh’s geopolitical positioning has become increasingly important. As the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and the formation of the Quad have shifted the strategic calculus in the region, China has intensified efforts to align Bangladesh with its broader geopolitical goals.
Previously hesitant to align too closely with Bangladesh due to Sheikh Hasina’s pro-India foreign policy, China has now redoubled its efforts to expand its influence in Bangladesh. This is particularly evident in the diversification of military and economic cooperation between the two countries, which is widely regarded as a counterbalance strategy to India’s dominance in South Asia. As Bangladesh navigates its foreign policy choices amidst the competing pressures of major global powers, its growing relationship with China is seen as a crucial element in its evolving geopolitical strategy.
Infrastructure & Connectivity Projects
In further strengthening the ties between China and Bangladesh, the proposed Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) seeks to boost trade, investment, and sectoral cooperation, which aligns seamlessly with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Bangladesh’s strategic location as a gateway to South Asia and the Indian Ocean solidifies its importance in China’s regional and global strategy, making it a key partner in these ambitious infrastructure and economic projects.
On December 24, 2024, Liu Jinsong, Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs of China’s Foreign Ministry, met with Nazmul Islam, the newly appointed Bangladesh Ambassador to China. During the meeting, Liu reaffirmed China’s commitment to strengthening its friendly cooperation with Bangladesh based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. He emphasized opportunities to further enhance ties, particularly with the upcoming 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the “China-Bangladesh Year of People-to-People Exchanges.” Liu also highlighted the importance of advancing Belt and Road cooperation to support their shared goals.
Healthcare Collaboration
In 2023, India’s medical tourism sector generated approximately $9 billion in revenue, playing a significant role in the country’s economy. However, following the August 5 decision to reduce visas for Bangladeshi nationals by 80 percent, the number of Bangladeshi patients seeking medical treatment in India has declined sharply. This development has led to a nearly 50 percent drop in the total number of foreign patients in Indian hospitals, creating a significant shift in regional medical tourism dynamics. Against this backdrop, China has welcomed Bangladesh’s proposal to establish the Bangladesh-China Friendship Hospital, a 1,000-bed tertiary-level facility in Purbachal, Dhaka, positioning itself as an alternative healthcare destination for Bangladeshi patients. This initiative is seen as a goodwill gesture in celebration of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations. While the construction of the new hospital will take several years, China has taken immediate steps to address the healthcare needs of Bangladeshis affected by the visa restrictions in India.
In response to Dhaka’s request, China has designated at least four hospitals in Kunming to provide medical treatment for Bangladeshi citizens. The first group of Bangladeshi patients, along with doctors and travel agencies, has already departed for China, marking the beginning of a new chapter in medical cooperation between the two countries. This initiative not only strengthens Bangladesh-China ties but also provides an alternative healthcare option for Bangladeshis who previously relied heavily on India for medical treatment.
Regional & Security Issues
The Rohingya crisis and Bay of Bengal security remain two of the most critical issues for Bangladesh, both in foreign affairs and domestic stability. Recognizing the prolonged nature of the crisis and its socio-economic impact, China has reiterated its support for a peaceful resolution aligned with international humanitarian principles. Through diplomatic negotiations, Bangladesh can leverage Beijing’s influence over Myanmar to push for secure and sustainable repatriation while reinforcing regional stability. Additionally, China’s strategic interest in the Bay of Bengal, particularly in safeguarding vital sea lanes, aligns with Bangladesh’s security priorities. This opens opportunities for both nations to collaborate on maritime security and anti-piracy measures, fostering a shared security framework. Expanding cooperation in these areas would not only enhance regional stability but also position Bangladesh as a proactive mediator in conflict resolution.
During his forthcoming meeting with President Xi Jinping, Dr. Muhammad Yunus is expected to emphasize two of South Asia’s most pressing humanitarian and security concerns: the repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar and the growing threat posed by the Arakan Army. These discussions hold critical importance, as Bangladesh continues to lead efforts in addressing the humanitarian crisis triggered by Rohingya displacement. Ensuring their safe and dignified repatriation is not just a matter of regional stability but a fundamental human rights issue that demands international intervention to guarantee their long-term security and well-being.
Dr. Yunus will stress China’s diplomatic leverage in persuading Myanmar to accelerate a systematic and humane repatriation plan. He is expected to seek Beijing’s commitment to securing a sustainable agreement that safeguards the rights and security of returning Rohingya refugees. Furthermore, discussions will address the evolving security landscape, particularly the implications of the Arakan Army’s operations. Dr. Yunus will advocate for a peaceful and pragmatic resolution that acknowledges the region’s complex socio-political dynamics and promotes long-term stability. Through this high-level diplomatic initiative, Dr. Yunus aims to reinforce the importance of multilateral cooperation in tackling one of the region’s most severe humanitarian crises. By encouraging collective responsibility in regional security, human rights, and peacebuilding, he will push for an integrated strategy—one that not only meets the immediate needs of refugees but also ensures geopolitical stability and peaceful coexistence. (The Business Standard, 2025)
The Strategic Importance of the Teesta River Project
Effective water resource management is crucial for Bangladesh’s agriculture, energy security, and economic development. The Teesta River, flowing from India into northern Bangladesh, is a vital water source, particularly for agriculture in the dry season. However, its unregulated flow often leads to both droughts and floods, threatening food security and livelihoods. A comprehensive Teesta River project could address these challenges by enhancing irrigation, mitigating floods through dams and reservoirs, and generating hydroelectric power to strengthen the national grid. Additionally, expanding inland water transport would boost regional trade and economic integration.
However, the project’s success depends on diplomatic negotiations with India to ensure equitable water-sharing agreements, especially in the face of climate change. Bangladesh must proactively engage in regional cooperation to secure its water rights and ensure sustainable development. Beyond infrastructure, the Teesta project is a strategic investment in Bangladesh’s future, reinforcing water security, disaster resilience, and economic growth. By prioritizing it, Bangladesh can strengthen its agricultural foundation, enhance energy security, and drive long-term national progress.
Conclusion
Muhammad Yunus’s visit to China serves as a significant turning point in Bangladesh’s foreign policy, demonstrating the country’s efforts to recalibrate its diplomatic and economic priorities amid a changing regional and global landscape. This visit, particularly symbolized by the special chartered flight offered by President Xi Jinping, emphasises the depth of China’s interest in strengthening ties with Bangladesh. This gesture not only highlights the importance of the bilateral relationship but also signifies China’s strategic focus on integrating Bangladesh into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and reinforcing its influence in South Asia, particularly in the Bay of Bengal, a key maritime region of geopolitical importance. For Bangladesh, engaging more closely with China is a pragmatic approach that seeks to address critical areas of development, such as infrastructure, industrialization, and digitalization. China’s expertise in these sectors aligns with Bangladesh’s developmental goals, making it an attractive partner for economic cooperation. However, this move comes with its challenges. Bangladesh’s historical and geographic ties with India cannot be overlooked, and any shift toward China may be seen as a delicate balancing act in regional diplomacy.
The visit, therefore, is not merely about fostering economic ties but also strategically positioning Bangladesh as a sovereign, independent nation that seeks to diversify its international relations without alienating any one neighbor. Yunus’s engagement with China should not be interpreted as a deliberate move to pivot away from India, but rather as a calculated effort to broaden Bangladesh’s foreign policy options, ensuring the country retains flexibility and leverage in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment. This diversification of foreign policy is essential for Bangladesh, as it seeks to preserve its strong relations with India while also exploring new partnerships that serve its national interests. The growing anti-India sentiment within Bangladesh, driven in part by perceptions of India’s influence under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership, makes this recalibration necessary. China, positioning itself as a counterbalance to India’s influence, offers Bangladesh an opportunity to assert its independence and gain more diplomatic autonomy, but this must be done without jeopardizing the country’s long-standing ties with its neighboring giant.
Yunus’s diplomatic efforts will need to be deft, ensuring that Bangladesh’s moves toward China are seen as a means of balancing interests rather than abandoning its relationship with India. Bangladesh’s future strategy will hinge on its ability to maintain a nuanced, respectful relationship with both China and India, navigating the complexities of regional alliances with skill. In doing so, Bangladesh can emerge as a more assertive player on the global stage, able to shape its own destiny without being overly dependent on any one country. Ultimately, Yunus’s visit to China represents an important moment for Bangladesh’s foreign policy, with the potential to redefine the country’s strategic position in South Asia. It offers a chance to balance economic inequalities, attract crucial investments, and solidify diplomatic ties that will support Bangladesh’s long-term growth and security. As Bangladesh continues to walk the fine line between India and China, its ability to maintain this balance will shape its future, both domestically and in the broader geopolitical context. This diplomatic initiative, if managed effectively, could mark a new chapter in Bangladesh’s rise as an independent and influential nation in the region.
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